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1. Introduction 
Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution in which parties refer disputes between 
them to be resolved by one or more arbitrators, which render a legally binding decision. 
Arbitration has become the principal way of resolving disputes in international commerce.1 It 
provides an efficient, confidential and impartial process driven by the power of party autonomy. 
It is in international business sometimes referred to as the “only truly neutral method” and as 
“the only viable option”.2 The overall success of arbitration is largely owed to the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“the Convention”). 
 
The Convention was adopted by the United Nations on June 10 1958 and establishes rules 
which are aimed at granting recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. To this effect, the 
Convention binds the Member States to ensure that arbitration agreements and arbitral awards 
are recognized and enforced within their territories. As prescribed in Article III, the Contracting 
States “shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them”.  
 
With 149 Member States as of December 2013, 3 the Convention is an unparalleled success. The 
wide recognition and acceptance means that arbitral awards are enforceable almost anywhere 
in the world. This global acceptance of the Convention is the main reason for the popularity of 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism within international commerce, and therefore 
the greatest achievement of the Convention itself. By contrast, there exist no equivalent 
instrument for the recognition and enforcement of court decisions.  
 
The New York Convention replaced the Geneva Convention of 1927 which in turn replaced the 
Geneva Protocol of 1923.  These two conventions represented the beginning of enforcement of 
arbitral awards. They were, however, far from arbitration friendly. The Geneva Convention 
contained broad grounds for non-recognition as well as a requirement of double exequatur. 
                                                          
1
 Redfern/Hunter, 1. 
2
 Toby T. Landau, Arbitral Lifelines: the Protection of Jurisdiction by Arbitrators, in van den Berg, International 
Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics?, 282. 
3
 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited 03.12.2013) 
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Additionally it placed the burden of proof on the party seeking to enforce an award. The New 
York Convention sought to remedy these shortcomings and to provide efficient and simple 
enforcement proceedings.  
 
The Convention seeks to provide the highest level of predictability and efficiency in the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. To this end, a fundamental objective of the 
Convention is that it is uniformly applied across all Contracting States. The continued success of 
the Convention depends on such uniform application by national courts worldwide. 
 
Now 55 years of age, it is inevitable that questions of modernization arise. The Convention has 
been criticized for being too short, incomplete and a product of too much compromise. This 
combined with its age has led to much discussion on whether the Convention is in need of 
reform and modernization.  
 
The Convention provides an exclusive and exhaustive list of grounds under which national 
courts may refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. The grounds are contained 
within Article V, making it one of the most significant articles of the Convention. The grounds 
functions as a safety valve as well as boundaries for the parties and arbitrators. Any arbitral 
award which does not fall within one of the listed grounds of non-recognition must be 
recognized and enforced. It therefore provides an international framework for non-recognition. 
The need of uniformity of interpretation is of fundamental importance to these grounds of non-
recognition and directly connected to the success of the Convention in its entirety. Some of the 
exceptions are ambiguous, leaving room for alternative, but equally justifiable, interpretations. 
A question therefore arises if Article V is successful in achieving such uniformity. 
 
This paper aspires to explore the problem of uniformity within the context of Article V. Due to 
the vast nature of this topic; selected problems under each exception will be presented. While 
this paper will not attempt to identify all possible reasons for non-recognition under each 
ground, global case-law will provide a framework for considering key matters. The selected 
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cases will be analyzed and compared to illustrate and uncover potential differences in 
interpretation. Based on these findings, the author will attempt to assess the gravity of existing 
problems of uniformity under Article V. The ultimate goal of the paper is to establish whether 
these findings support a need to reform Article V or whether any issues of uniformity is 
outweighed by the global benefits of the Convention. 
 
In the following, Article V will be presented in detail, followed by individual sections for each of 
the seven grounds for non-recognition. The problem of uniformity and need for reform will be 
commented upon in each of these individual sections. The final section will provide an 
evaluation of the current state of uniformity and a conclusion as to the necessity of reform. 
 
2. Grounds for non-recognition: Article V 
Article V of the Convention lists the grounds under which national courts may refuse to 
recognize and refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award. The Article is divided into two sections. 
Section V(1) contains five grounds which may be raised by the resisting party, while section V(2) 
contain two additional grounds which may be raised by the court ex officio.  
 
In light of the aim of this paper, it is of interest to identify which grounds are most commonly 
relied upon by resisting parties. Although no global surveys have been conducted, a recent 
study from Switzerland offers guidance. 4 The ground most often relied upon before Swiss 
courts was that of public policy in V(2)(b) followed by V(1)(d), V(1)(c) and V(1)(b). While not 
globally representative, it comes as no surprise that the wide exception of public policy is 
frequently used, as will be seen below.5 
 
The exhaustive nature of the grounds means that courts may not refuse to enforce an award 
due to mistakes of law or fact. As already mentioned, the general rule is that the Contracting 
States shall recognize and enforce arbitral awards. All grounds for non-recognition should be 
construed narrowly in in the light of the Convention’s aim to endeavor recognizable and 
                                                          
4
 Borris/Hennecke in Wolff, 239. 
5
 See section 2.7. 
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enforceable awards. As said by a renowned commentator on the New York Convention: “they 
have to be construed narrowly”.6 National courts have largely recognized this need for narrow 
interpretations,7  which will be seen in the sections below. 
 
Article V(1) reads that recognition and enforcement “may” be refused. The wording grants 
national courts discretion as to whether recognition or enforcement should be refused.  The 
wording is “permissive, not mandatory”.8 A Hong Kong judge quite accurately described this 
discretion: “[T]he grounds of opposition are not to be inflexibly applied. The residual discretion 
enables the enforcing Court to achieve a just result in all the circumstances.”9  This discretion 
may seem misplaced in light of the aim of uniformity. In Germany “may” has been interpreted 
as “shall”, leaving no discretion to the courts.10  French Courts also lack such discretion.11 In 
practice, these differences in discretion appear to have no impact on the practice in the 
Member States.12 
 
Under the Convention, the burden of proof is on the party resisting recognition or enforcement. 
This can be read directly out of Article V(1). It is one of the most important components to 
facilitate efficiency and enforceability of arbitral awards and one of the most significant 
improvements compared to the Geneva Convention.  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”) has been 
designed to help States in reforming and modernizing their domestic arbitration laws.13 The law 
covers all stages of the arbitral process and is parallel to the Convention. It aims to provide for 
harmonization of domestic legislation and thus international uniformity within the field of 
                                                          
6
 van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, 267 and 268.  
7
 Redfern/Hunter, 640. 
8
 Ibid, 639. 
9
 China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd, [1995] HKLR 215 in 
Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, 707 
10
 Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port, 208.  
11
 Ibid., 209. 
12
 Ibid., 209.  
13
 See: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html (last visited: 
03.12.2013) 
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international commercial arbitration. Legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted by 
a large number of jurisdictions.14 The grounds to set aside an award under the Model Law are 
parallel to Article V of the Convention.15 The Model Law therefore compliments the Convention 
and helps its effectiveness. Due to the large similarities between the text of the Convention and 
the Model Law, examples from the latter will be used in this paper. 
 
The grounds set forth in Article V(1) of the Convention deal with procedural issues, enabling 
national courts to oversee that basic principles of procedure has been respected through the 
course of arbitration. The Convention therefore serves the important function of imposing a 
framework of minimum procedural requirements on international arbitrators. In the following, 
the seven grounds set forth in Article V will be presented individually in sections 2.1 through 2.7. 
 
2.1 Article V(1)(a) 
Article V(1)(a) prescribes the first grounds for non-recognition. Where a party was under some 
“incapacity” or where “the agreement is not valid”, an award may be refused recognition or 
enforcement. The term “[A]greement” refers to is the arbitration agreement, shown through 
the reference to Article II. The parties may be physical or legal persons as well as states and 
state entities.16 Particular problems arise when dealing with states. This problem will be given 
more attention, below. 
 
The two grounds will be dealt with in the following, focusing on issues which has given rise to 
difference in interpretation. 
 
2.1.1 Incapacity 
Incapacity refers to a party’s lack of legal capacity to submit to arbitration17. The wording “[t]he 
                                                          
14
 A complete list is available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited: 
25.11.2013) 
15
 See Article 34 of the Model Law. 
16
 See Article I(1). 
17
 Nacimiento in Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port, 218. 
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parties” may indicate that both parties was under some incapacity. Such a solution appears 
unsatisfactory. It is enough that one party lacked the legal capacity to conclude the arbitration 
agreement.  The general rule is that any party with the capacity to conclude a contract also has 
the capacity to conclude an arbitration agreement.18  
 
The Article uses the past tense, prescribing that the parties “were […] under some incapacity”. 
The wording refers to the parties having the necessary capacity at the time of concluding the 
agreement to arbitrate. 19 In Seung Woo Lee the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly 
stated that incapacity must be present at the time of consummation of the agreement.20 This is 
an internationally undisputed matter today. 
 
In the U.S., the New York County Supreme Court commented that: “incapacity […] [is] to be 
narrowly read and refers to ‘internationally recognized [defences] such as duress, mistake fraud 
or waiver”.21 In Canada, the courts have accepted a line of argument suggesting that oppression, 
high pressure tactics or misrepresentation may justify a finding of incapacity.22 Incapacity may 
additionally be found when a party lacks special permissions needed for foreign trade or when a 
person without sufficient authority signed the arbitration agreement.23 
 
The question of incapacity is to be determined under “the law applicable to them”. The 
Convention does not prescribe which choice-of-law rules that should determine the applicable 
law. This question must be resolved through the application of the conflict-of-law rules of the 
jurisdiction where the award is sought enforced.24 Private international law is a national matter, 
and solutions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. National variation may lead to unexpected 
results, and some important differences exist in this regard. Such differences affect uniformity 
of interpretation. 
                                                          
18
 Redfern/Hunter, 95. 
19
 Wilske/Fox in Wolff, 272. 
20
 Seung Woo Lee v Imaging3 Inc., No. 06-55993, 283 Fed. App 490 (9th Cir. 2007) 
21
 Corcoran v. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc., 143 Misc. 2d 62 (1989) 
22
 Grow Biz v. D.L.T. Holdings Inc. 2001 PESCTD 27 in Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port, 219. 
23
 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, 708. 
24
 van den Berg, 276. 
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In common-law jurisdictions, the personal law of individuals is the law of the place of residence. 
This differs from civil-law jurisdictions, where nationality is the decisive factor.25 As to 
corporations, legal capacity to enter into contracts is generally governed by the law of the place 
of the seat in civil law jurisdictions, and at the place of incorporation in common law 
jurisdictions.26 In these situations the determination of the applicable law is generally 
unproblematic. 
 
States and state-owned entities create difficulties which require further comment. States and 
state-entities may claim to lack the capacity to arbitrate through its own legislation. It may be 
that the state law altogether prohibits the state or state-entities from entering into arbitration 
agreements, or that approvals from certain national authorities are needed in order to do so.27  
 
Some national arbitration laws have attempted to altogether remove this issue. Article 2(2) of 
the Spanish Arbitration Act prescribes that, within the field of international arbitration, a “State 
or company, organization or enterprise controlled by a State, shall not be able to invoke the 
prerogatives of its own law in order to avoid the obligations arising from the arbitration 
agreement.” A provision to the same effect also exists in Switzerland. 28 
 
On the other hand, the Model Law and numerous other national arbitration laws do not deal 
with the issue. It has been addressed by courts on numerous occasions. Courts have generally 
declined arguments of incapacity or lack of subject-matter arbitrability.  The defense may be 
considered a violation of good faith or breach of the principle of pacta sunt servanda.29 It has 
also been found that the entering of an arbitration agreement may be considered a waiver of 
any claims of sovereign immunity. It is clearly unfortunate when a State claims incapacity or 
immunity at the time of enforcement.   
                                                          
25
 Born, 2785.   
26
 Wilske/Fox in Wolff, 274.  
27
 Redfern/Hunter, 97. 
28
 Article 177(2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act. 
29
 Naciemento in Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port, 220.  
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The Swedish Court of Appeal commented that: “it is shocking per se that one of the contracting 
parties later refuses to … respect a duly rendered award. When a state is concerned, it is 
therefore a natural interpretation to consider, in accepting the arbitration clause, committed 
itself not to obstruct the arbitral proceedings or their consequences, by invoking immunity.”30 
The French courts introduced a rule stating that lack of subject-matter arbitrability may not be 
invoked to invalidate contracts in international trade.31 The stance taken by the two mentioned 
jurisdictions helps strengthen the efficiency of the Convention regarding arbitration agreements 
involving states or state-entities. 
 
Disregarding these arguments, certain jurisdictions claim absolute state immunity. An important 
recent case from Hong Kong (“HK”) illustrates how the principle of absolute state immunity 
complicates arbitration agreements involving states or state entities.32 
 
In this landmark decision, a financing agreement between Energoinvest and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) led to a default by the latter. International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration was initiated and two awards were rendered in favor of 
Energoinvest. Initially being granted enforcement in HK, the DRC appealed, claiming sovereign 
immunity. Energoinvest argued that HK common law of restricted immunity applied and that 
the DRC in all cases had waived its state immunity by agreeing to arbitrate.  
 
The question for the Court of Final Appeal was what scope of state immunity the courts of HK 
should recognize. Should the Court apply the traditional common law rule of restricted 
immunity that applied before the return of HK to mainland China on 1 July 1997? Or should the 
court now apply the absolute immunity applied in China? The majority applied the Basic Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (the “Basic Law”), under which absolute immunity, without 
exceptions, is the undisputed rule. Prior to 1997, HK followed the United Kingdom’s State 
                                                          
30
 Libyan American Oil Co v Socialist People’s Republic of Libya, Svea Court of Appeal, ILM 893 (1981) in 
Redfern/Hunter, 98.  
31
 Naciemento in Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port, 220. 
32
 Democratic Republic of the Congo & Others v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] HKCFA 41 
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Immunity Act 1978, which included a commercial exception to state immunity. The Court found 
that this Act could no longer apply as common law principles on state immunity had to be 
modified by the Basic Law, in light of HK’s special administrative region status within the 
People’s Republic of China as of 1997. Having found this, the Court concluded that the DRC had 
clearly not submitted to the jurisdiction of HK courts. The award could thus not be enforced in 
HK. However, the Court found that, under the Basic Law, HK courts does not have final 
jurisdiction over state and foreign affairs, and that sovereign immunity is such a matter. The 
Basic Law leaves such matters to the Central People’s Government and the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress (the “SCNPC”). The HK Court, therefore, sought an 
interpretation from the SCNPC, which confirmed the majority view.33 
 
The judgment has given rise to large debate as it affirms absolute state immunity without a 
commercial exception. The judgment therefore limits the effectiveness of international 
commercial arbitration in Hong Kong and mainland China where states or state entities are 
involved. It is a blow to the general international trend of rejecting immunity claims in 
enforcement proceedings. In consequence, this has a negative impact on uniformity. It is a 
difference in interpretation which raises some concern. A practicable remedy today is for 
parties to exercise care in entering into agreements with states, such as including waivers of 
sovereign immunity in contracts with states and additionally seek enforcement in arbitration 
friendly jurisdictions.  Although harmful to overall uniformity, the problem must not be 
exaggerated. Few Member States practice absolute state immunity, giving the matter limited 
practical impact.  
 
2.1.2 Invalidity of arbitration agreement  
The second ground for non-recognition under Article V(1)(a) concerns the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. It is an important provision, as arbitration is based solely on the 
agreement to arbitrate. While the majority of decisions deny claims of invalidity,34 a particularly 
unfortunate set of decisions will be presented which illustrates how the interaction of different 
                                                          
33
 Democratic Republic of the Congo & Others v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] HKCFA 66  
34
 Born, 2779. 
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domestic courts may lead to results harmful to the Convention. 
 
Article II(1) to (3) sets forth the conditions under which an agreement is considered valid. It is 
recognized that Article II governs the formal validity requirements of the arbitration agreement 
under Article V(1)(a), as it is explicitly referred to in the wording of the provision. The 
requirement of writing contained in Article II has been debated, as national laws as well as the 
Model Law better reflects modern ways of communication, relaxing the formal requirements.35 
In practice almost all arbitration agreements are written, and this problem will not be given 
more attention here. 
 
This section of Article V(1)(a) contains a choice-of-law rule, prescribing party autonomy as the 
general rule. Namely that validity is to be reviewed in accordance with the law chosen by the 
parties. If the agreement contains no such agreement, the law of the country where the award 
was made will be considered the applicable law. This is almost without exception the law where 
the arbitral tribunal had its seat.36 
 
The mentioned unfortunate judgments dealing with the validity of an arbitration agreement are 
the recent Dallah decisions from the Paris Court of Appeals and the UK Supreme Court.  
 
Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding (“Dallah”) entered into an agreement with a Trust which 
had been established by the Pakistani Government after negotiations between the two. 
Problems quickly arose. All communications were between Dallah and Government officials, on 
Government letterhead. The Trust ceased to exist as the Government did not renew it. 
Government officials wrote to Dallah, terminating the agreement. The Trust initially sued Dallah 
in Pakistan, but the claim was dismissed as the Trust was no longer in existence. Dallah initiated 
ICC arbitration against Pakistan. Pakistan claimed, inter alia, that it was not a party and that 
                                                          
35
 See Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration as amended in 2006, 25, containing two new alternatives for Article 7. The first alternative relaxes the 
requirement of writing while the second removes it altogether. 
36
 Article 25(3) of the ICC Rules and Article §§ 52(5) and 53 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996. 
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there could be no valid arbitration agreement. The arbitrators37 applied French arbitration law, 
finding that Pakistan was the alter ego of the Trust and that there was a valid agreement to 
arbitrate. The Tribunal rendered an award in favor of Dallah.  
 
Dallah sought enforcement in England and recognition in France. Pakistan resisted in both 
jurisdictions, maintaining that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate. 
 
Applying French law, the UK Court applied a principle of common intention in determining 
whether Pakistan was a party to the agreement.38 The test allows for a non-signatory party to 
be bound if the facts show that there was a common intention to be bound by the said 
agreement. Although the arbitral tribunal had established its jurisdiction, the English Court held 
that it was not bound or restricted by such a decision.39 In its own review of the principle of 
common intention, the Court found that there was no common intention between Pakistan and 
Dallah. The Court commented that a “proper application of French law” showed no material 
sufficient to justify the arbitrator’s conclusion that the Government was a true party to the 
Agreement.40 According to the Court, the “intention was that the parties were to be Dallah and 
the Trust”.41 With these findings, the Court concluded that there was no valid arbitration 
agreement and refused enforcement. 
 
In the Paris Court of Appeal decision a few months later, the French court applied the same 
principles of French law.42 Unlike the UK Court, The Paris Court of Appeal established that 
Pakistan had an intention to be bound by the agreement, looking to the conduct of the 
Government from the pre-contractual stage, to the creation of the Trust and subsequent 
                                                          
37
 Including Lord Mustill, a retired English House of Lords judge and leading expert on international arbitration. 
38
 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan 
[2010] UKSC 46, para 17 and 18. 
39
 Ibid., para. 31 and 32. 
40
 Ibid., para. 145. 
41
 Ibid., para. 145. 
42
 Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Cour d’Appel 
de Paris, February 17, 2011. 
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communications.43 The Government had acted as if the contract was its own. Pakistan was 
considered as the alter ego of the Trust and the arbitral award was upheld. 
 
Applying the same principles of French law, the courts reached different conclusions. The 
development is unfortunate in light of the Conventions aim of uniformity and efficiency. One 
apparent issue was that the UK Court corrected the tribunal’s award, an award which was 
binding and final upon the parties. In addition, Article VI allows for a stay of proceedings where 
annulment proceedings have been initiated in the place of arbitration. The UK court did not 
make use of the provision, although it was made aware of the French proceedings. It is 
particularly remarkable as the case had strong ties to France and French law. Having followed 
such procedures, this unfortunate situation could have been avoided altogether. Born also 
criticizes the UK Supreme Court for not having “applied the real substance of the French 
standards when evaluating the parties’ actual conduct and agreements.”44 The cases illustrate 
how the use of foreign law in enforcement proceedings may lead to unfortunate results. 
Looking at the Convention, it would, if followed, have prevented the event in question.45 
Uniformity would therefore have been achieved, would the Convention have been applied 
correctly. While these decisions do not reflect a failure in the Convention itself, they do harm 
arbitration and indirectly the efficiency and legitimacy of the Convention. 
 
2.2 Article V(1)(b) 
Article V(1)(b) prescribes two alternative grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of an 
arbitral award. While the first part is a strictly formal matter, the second part of the provision 
refers to the basic right to a fair hearing. It is aimed at ensuring that the arbitral proceedings 
conform to the requirements of due process, permitting defenses of “grave procedural 
unfairness”.46 It provides a “fundamental basis for the integrity of dispute resolution 
                                                          
43
 Gary Born, Dallah and the New York Convention: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/04/07/dallah-and-
the-new-york-convention/ (last visited 03.12.2013)  
44
 Ibid. 
45
 See Article VI. 
46
 Born, 2737. 
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mechanisms”.47  
 
In a recent global study of 136 enforcement decisions in which the resisting party claimed a 
V(1)(b) defense, only 14 succeeded.48 The low level of successful claims indicates that courts 
generally follow the Convention’s pro enforcement bias. It should, and correctly so, be narrowly 
construed as the other grounds contained within Article V. In light of party autonomy and the 
arbitrators’ discretion, only the most evident and fundamental breaches of due process should 
lead to refusal of recognition or enforcement. 
 
It is widely accepted that awards may only be refused enforcement or recognition if the 
procedural flaws had a probable effect on the tribunal’s decision.49 Put in other words: would 
the tribunal have reached a different result absent the procedural flaw?  
 
Having made these introductory remarks, let us consider the two grounds further.  
 
2.2.1 Proper notice 
The requirement of proper notice applies to the appointment of the arbitrators as well as the 
arbitration proceedings. A notice is generally considered proper if it contains adequate form and 
language and if it is served in a timely manner on the correct addressee(s).50 Due to the 
straightforward nature of such claims and the overall uniformity of approach, these questions 
will not be discussed further. 
 
2.2.2 Procedural fairness  
This second alternative contains a broader right to a fair hearing. As the wording shows, it deals 
with all procedural issues.  
 
The Convention gives no reference as to which law is to govern the determination of procedural 
                                                          
47
 Scherer in Wolff, 280. 
48
 See Jana/Armer/Kranenberg in Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port, 233. 
49
 Born, 2763. 
50
 Scherer in Wolff, 294. 
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fairness. This silence has led to international differences. A dominating approach exists however, 
an approach which the author believes to be advantageous.  
 
In Whittemore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the provision 
“essentially sanctions the application of the Forum State's standards of due process.”51 U.S. 
courts thus apply the due process standards of the enforcing court. They do not however, apply 
the regular domestic standard of due process. Instead a minimum standard of fairness is applied, 
which aims at preventing only fundamental breaches of procedural fairness. As shown in a 
decision from the Seventh Circuit, the parties must have had a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard, but “should not expect the same procedures they would find in [the] judicial arena.”52 
Other decisions contain similar statements.53 While applying the law of the enforcing court, a 
distinction is drawn between domestic procedure and procedural standards under the 
Convention. This minimum procedural standard has found wide acceptance in the Member 
States, and has been adopted by Germany, France, Switzerland and Spain, to mention some.54   
 
While the general procedural standards of different jurisdictions differ, the wide adoption of the 
minimum standard approach helps lessen such differences. It also shows that national courts 
acknowledge the importance of the Convention as an international instrument with special 
requirements regarding procedure. Additionally the large adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
helps ambitions of a uniform approach to the matter of procedural fairness.  
 
Let us move on to address a couple of judgments dealing with procedural fairness and assess 
whether there exist any notable domestic variations which has an effect on uniformity.  
 
In an English Court of Appeal decision,55 the respondent was unable to attend the oral hearing 
due to serious illness. The claimant made serious accusations of fraud against the respondent at 
                                                          
51
 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1974) 
52
 Generica Limited v Pharmaceuticals Basics Inc., 125 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir.1997) on 1130. 
53
 See for example Parsons & Whittemore, on page 975. 
54
 Scherer in Wolff, 284.  
55
 Kanoria and others v Guinness [2006] EWCA Civ 222 
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this hearing.  The tribunal rendered a decision based on these accusations. The English Court 
noted that the evidence presented “greatly” altered the nature of the case and that it was clear 
that the respondent was unable to present his case. The party seeking enforcement argued that 
recognition should be given due to the discretionary wording of Article V(1). The judge held that 
“[t]his is an extreme case of potential injustice.” Lord Justice May added that it was an 
“exceptional case, as I see it, where no notice was given of an allegation of fraud.” Enforcement 
was subsequently refused. The case presents a procedural right which would be acknowledged 
in almost any jurisdiction. Serious procedural flaws as the above rarely occur, and the case is 
quite correctly described as both exceptional and extreme. As mentioned, the numbers of cases 
accepting due process defenses are few, making the decision an example of how fundamental a 
procedural flaw must be to justify non-recognition or non-enforcement. 
 
A far more common example is found in the previously mentioned case of Generica Limited. 56 
As shown above, the Court specified that the parties to arbitration could not expect the same 
procedures they would find through domestic litigation. The judge exemplified that the minimal 
fairness standard included adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence and an impartial decision 
by the arbitrators.  The claimants reduced right to witness cross-examination was not a 
fundamental breach of U.S. due process or the Convention. Enforcement was granted. As with 
most Article V(1)(b) defenses, it was rejected by the court. While the importance of procedural 
fairness should not be understated, it is equally important to the Convention that only 
fundamental flaws lead to non-enforcement.  
 
Enforcing courts will review claims of procedural fairness to ensure that the arbitration 
respected the parties’ rights and equality. Regardless of jurisdiction, domestic courts leave the 
arbitrators a substantial level of discretion concerning procedural matters. Although different 
courts operate with different requirements to procedural fairness, the practical consequences 
of these differences are small. National courts will only refuse recognition in cases containing 
fundamental procedural flaws that have had an impact on the outcome of the award. Practice in 
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the Member States appears to be in line with the Convention’s purposes, which is positive in 
ways of achieving uniformity of interpretation. As suggested in theory, existing differences may 
be reduced even further through an international standard of minimal procedural fairness. 
While such a standard might help further limit existing differences, it is equally likely to bring 
with it new complications. The continued support of the already existing and accepted 
minimum procedural standard based on domestic procedural laws appears to be a viable 
solution which helps achieve international uniformity.  
2.3 Article V(1)(c) 
The third ground for non-recognition covers two situations. The first deals with “a difference not 
contemplated by” or “not falling within” the terms of submission. In this situation the tribunal 
rendered a decision beyond its jurisdiction or without jurisdiction. The tribunal did something 
else. In the second situation the tribunal rendered an award “beyond the scope” of the 
submission to arbitration, exceeding its given jurisdiction. The tribunal did too much. 
 
The issue in both situations is whether the tribunal acted within its sphere of authority. The 
agreement between the parties sets the boundaries for this sphere, a result of the principle of 
party autonomy. The parties are the masters of the arbitral process and the tribunal derives its 
authority from the parties’ agreement.  
 
Courts rarely recognize a V(1)(c) defense, even if the arbitral body goes beyond the formal 
requests, as long as the award is within the limits of the agreement to arbitrate. It is common 
that arbitration agreements contain broad submissions, referring “any and all disputes” to 
arbitration. Such clauses leave substantial discretion to the arbitrators. As long as no explicit 
limitations are contained within the agreement or submission, courts will generally not second-
guess the body’s decisions as to its authority. In addition, most jurisdictions operate with a 
presumption that an arbitral award was rendered within the scope of authority.57 In the 
Whittemore-decision, the judge described this presumption. There is a “powerful presumption 
that the arbitral body acted within its powers” and that “the Convention [...] does not sanction 
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second-guessing the arbitrator’s construction of the parties’ agreement”. The court cannot 
“ignore this limitation on its decision-making powers and usurp the arbitrator’s role.”58 The last 
statement also emphasizes the importance of the court not re-examining the merits of the 
arbitral award. It may only decide whether the tribunal construed the scope of the arbitration 
agreement properly. As will be seen, this determination sometimes proves to be difficult.  
 
Having made these introductory remarks, let us consider the grounds further. 
 
2.3.1 Matters outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
The scope of submission is determined by the arbitration agreement. The agreement needs to 
be interpreted in order to establish the intention of the parties. The parties’ intention provides 
the legitimate jurisdiction of the arbitrators. The first question is which law should govern this 
interpretation.  
 
If the parties have chosen a law to govern the arbitration, this law must be applied in 
accordance with the principle of party autonomy. Mandatory provisions of the law in question 
must be taken into account. If the parties have not chosen a law, Article V(1)(c) does not 
provide which law should govern the interpretation. Applying a analogical interpretation of 
Article V(1)(a), the law of the place of arbitration should govern. 
 
Due to the case-specific nature of determining whether the parties intended for an issue to be 
included in the arbitration, this paper will not attempt to list different situations which may lead 
to excess of jurisdiction. More important in the context of this paper is that excess of authority 
defenses rarely succeed. However, a recent U.S. decision has created a potential loophole under 
which undesirable awards may be refused recognition or enforcement. This decision deserves 
comment.  
 
The case of Stolt-Nielsen concerns the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) which contains a defense 
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largely similar to that of the Convention.59 AnimalFeeds filed an antitrust class action lawsuit 
against, among others, Stolt-Nielsen. The arbitral tribunal, although the contract was silent on 
the issue of class action, decided to permit it. In the enforcement proceedings, Stolt-Nielsen 
claimed that the tribunal had acted in excess of jurisdiction. The District Court accepted the 
defense, but the Second Circuit reversed. The question for the Supreme Court was whether 
imposing a class action is permissible under the FAA when the contract is silent. The majority 
reasoned that the arbitral tribunal exceeded its powers by applying its own policy instead of a 
rule derived from FAA or other applicable law. It emphasized consent as the fundamental 
principle of arbitration, which it found was non-existing in the case in question. The Supreme 
Court thus reversed. The dissenting judges took an arbitration friendly approach, focusing on 
the strict limitations to judicial review under the FAA. The dissenting approach better 
corresponds with earlier US practice dealing with the Convention.60 
 
The case has given rise to debate in the U.S. The Supreme Court essentially found that silence in 
the agreement meant that it was not the intention of the parties. It has in the opinion of Moses, 
“breathed new life into the “excess of authority” ground for vacatur”.61 The gravest concern to 
the Convention is whether the decision may be used analogically on Article V(1)(c). Moses 
suggests this as a possibility.62 While some concern may be justified, U.S. practice generally 
shows deference to the arbitrators. In other jurisdictions the issue is less likely to arise, as class 
action is a U.S. phenomenon. Globally there has been remarkably little inconsistency to this 
ground of non-recognition. 
 
The next topic deals with the second ground under the provision, namely that the award 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. 
 
2.3.2 The tribunal exceeded its authority 
A typical excess of authority occurs in relation to the law applicable to the substance of the 
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dispute. A variety of situations may arise in this regard. If the tribunal has disregarded a choice 
of law by the parties, this may be an excess of authority under Article V(1)(c). Any experienced 
arbitral body respects the parties’ choice of law, giving the matter little practical importance. 
However, more ambiguous situations may occur. What law should be applicable if the parties 
refer to international law or general principles of international law? 
  
Courts have generally acknowledged that arbitral tribunal’s have wide discretion in this regard. 
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not find an excess of authority where the ICC tribunal 
applied the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and principles of good 
faith and fair dealing as the parties had agreed to “application of general principles of 
international law and trade usages”.63 In addition, such defenses may be rejected on the basis 
of waiver. Objections should be raised during the arbitral proceedings. This is the case under 
German law.64 Similarly, under Article V(2) of the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, a party may not invoke a lack of jurisdiction defense if it was not raised 
during the arbitral proceedings.  
 
Excess of authority also occurs when the tribunal goes beyond the parties’ requests for relief. 
The resisting party may claim that the tribunal issued an award prescribing broader relief than 
requested, and thus going beyond its competence. This is known as ultra petita. Different courts 
have largely maintained the restricted and narrow approach seen above. 
 
A straightforward example of ultra petita is found in a Paris Court of Appeal decision.65 The 
arbitral tribunal had doubled the claimed amount of interest in its decision.  According to the 
Paris Court the award clearly contained decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission.  
 
The law of the seat of arbitration and the law chosen by the parties may lead to different results.  
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Where such law allows it, a tribunal may be allowed to award such relief. An important example 
is that of punitive damages, which may be substantial. In Mastrobuono66 the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that awarded punitive damages, beyond the amount claimed, was not an excess of 
power by the tribunal as applicable New York law permitted such damages. The court looked to 
the agreement, which stipulated that “any controversy” was to be governed by the laws of the 
State of New York. The Court had no trouble concluding that wide arbitration clauses would 
justify any relief in accordance with the chosen rules. The judgment is a manifestation of the 
deference shown to the arbitrators and the importance of arbitration. In another US decision 
the court held that judicial review is limited to cases where the terms of the award are 
“completely irrational”.67   
 
The above shows that the boundaries for the arbitrators’ competence may be hard to predict 
for the parties. Parties should for the highest levels of predictability explicitly limit the tribunal’s 
authority in their contracts and carefully consider any chosen arbitration rules.  It is from the 
above visible that the problem arise out of the agreement to arbitrate and the applicable 
arbitration rules. The parties include wide and unlimited arbitration clauses which gives the 
arbitrators the widest level of discretion. While the result of such clauses may come as a 
surprise to the losing party, it is a matter of contract drafting and not a consequence of 
domestic differences of interpretation. The Convention itself has been successful in striking a 
balance between procedural fairness and accommodating effective enforcement and 
recognition of arbitral awards. In ways of uniformity there are no compelling reasons to modify 
Article V(1)(c) of the Convention. 
 
2.4 Article V(1)(d) 
The fourth ground prescribes that recognition may be refused if the composition of the tribunal 
or procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such 
agreement, with the law of the country where the arbitration took place. 
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The wording overlaps with Article V(1)(b) which sets standards for due process and proper 
notice. Given the experience of most arbitrators, the issue of composition and procedure rarely 
arise in practice. It is uncommon for such trivial flaws to occur.  
 
Only if the parties have not made a choice of law may the enforcing court apply the “law of the 
country where the arbitration took place”.  The words used are vague, unlike those used in 
Article V(1)(a), which refers to the “law of the country where the award was made”.  Arbitral 
proceedings sometimes take place in multiple countries. In practice the interpretation has been 
the same as under Article V(1)(a), meaning that the law applicable is that of the seat of 
arbitration.   
 
The laws of the place of arbitration will often become relevant in the arbitration process 
through its mandatory laws, which may restrict party autonomy.  An award contrary to such 
provisions may be set aside at the place of arbitration and subsequently be refused recognition 
and enforcement under V(1)(e).68 Should the tribunal disregard party autonomy and instead 
apply mandatory rules however, this choice may violate the rule of party autonomy in V(1)(d) 
and lead to the award being refused recognition. This friction is quite clearly problematic and 
may put the arbitrators in difficult situations. This seemingly inner contradiction is unfortunate 
and of great importance to the question of uniformity. How may this problem best be solved? 
 
An important question is how far the enforcing court should respect and enforce such foreign 
mandatory rules at the time of enforcement. Article V(1)(d) explicitly gives priority to party 
autonomy. Foreign procedure is of little value in the recognition and enforcement proceedings 
in a third state. The state has no obligation to enforce mandatory laws of the seat of arbitration 
and neither should it attempt to do so. The law of the place of arbitration has deliberately been 
given a secondary and supplementary position under the provision, which should be respected. 
More importantly, the resisting party may seek annulment at the seat of arbitration. A failure to 
do so may thus be considered an act of waiver which should not have an effect at the 
                                                          
68
 See section 2.5, below. 
22 
 
enforcement stage. This view appears to have been widely adapted in theory, meaning the 
agreement of the parties should prevail even if it violated mandatory rules of the place of 
arbitration.69 Consequently, an award in line with the parties’ agreement but in breach of 
mandatory rules will rarely be refused enforcement by national courts.  
 
Domestic law may also become relevant where the parties have made a choice of law, if the 
chosen procedural rules are incomplete. Domestic law may supplement and fill gaps in the rules 
chosen by the parties. This approach is common and has been adapted in, among others, the 
ICC Rules of Arbitration (the “ICC Rules”).70 
 
While the first alternative of the provision deals with the composition of the arbitral authority, 
the second alternative deals with all sides of the arbitral procedure. Despite the wide grasp of 
the wording, reviewing courts show deference to the arbitral authority. Procedural defects 
under both alternatives must have affected the decision; the losing party must have been 
prejudiced. Most domestic courts operate with such a requirement.71 
 
The procedure stretches from the filing of the action to the rendering of the award. Procedural 
flaws can occur at any stage of the proceedings and will depend on the applicable procedural 
rules. Here, a selection of cases will be used to illustrate the abovementioned elements of the 
provision.  
 
In a Hong Kong decision,72 the question was whether the court should refuse enforcement of an 
award based on Article 36(1)(iv) of the Model Law, which contains the same wording as Article 
V(1)(d). The party resisting enforcement held that the composition of the tribunal was not in 
accordance with the agreement, which stipulated arbitration before the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), Beijing. The award had been rendered 
by CIETAC Shenzhen.  The court found that CIETAC Shenzhen lacked jurisdiction to render an 
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award, which should have been referred to CIETAC Beijing. However, the defendant had 
participated in the proceedings and had not reserved its right to object. Based on this finding, 
the court concluded that the defendant had waived its right to object at the time of 
enforcement. Supporting this conclusion, the Court added that CIETAC Shenzhen provided 
CIETAC arbitration using the CIETAC Rules which were essential components of the parties’ 
agreement. The Supreme Court of Hong Kong ruled that the award was enforceable. As seen, 
the court correctly made a judgment based on the intent of the parties. The Court’s decision to 
make use of waiver and estoppel shows how HK courts strive to achieve the aim for enforceable 
awards, although grounds of non-recognition are present. 
 
A decision from Italy73 illustrates the role of national law as well as a problem of tribunal 
composition. The agreement prescribed for three arbitrators, one appointed by each party and 
the third appointed by the arbitrators. The defendant failed to appoint its arbitrator and the 
sole arbitrator rendered an award in favor of the claimant, in accordance with English law. The 
Italian court ruled that the use of English law was permitted to supplement the agreement, 
which was silent on the problem. In a similar Italian decision,74 the parties’ agreement 
prescribed for proceedings with three arbitrators. The award was made by two arbitrators on 
the basis of English practice. The Court rejected this approach as the parties’ had explicitly 
agreed to arbitration with three arbitrators. The above decisions show the supplementary role 
of national law and the priority given to the parties’ agreement. It is as in the Hong Kong 
decision clear that the court respect party autonomy and attempt to reach decisions which best 
reflect the intention of the parties.  
 
Parties may have chosen to have pre-arbitral dispute resolution to avoid arbitration altogether. 
Failure to comply with such an agreement may lead to non-recognition. In a German decision,75 
the Court rejected the defense as the agreement merely provided that the parties should 
attempt to reach a settlement prior to initiating any arbitration proceedings. Such attempts had 
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been made and there were no other formal requirements for the pre-arbitration negotiations.  
 
From the above decisions it is visible that party autonomy is given priority by both the 
arbitrators and the reviewing courts. The number of cases dealing with the V(1)(d) defence are 
few. Arbitrators are usually experienced and professional and rarely make such mistakes. The 
arbitrators will go far to adapt to the will of parties, leaving less room for such objections at the 
stage of enforcement. Domestic courts are generally left with matters which are straightforward 
and based on the agreement to arbitrate. Article V(1)(d) defences therefore seldom cause issues 
for enforcing courts. The provision itself leaves little ambiguity and appears to be applied 
consistently and uniformly across the Member States.  
 
2.5 Article V(1)(e) 
The final ground for non-recognition under the first paragraph prescribes three grounds under 
which recognition or enforcement may be refused. Where the award has not become “binding”, 
where it has been “set aside” and where it has been “suspended” by a “competent authority of 
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.” 
 
The provision has a drafting history which is essential to understanding its purpose and existing 
differences in interpretation.  
 
Under the Geneva Convention, a decision had to be “final” in order to be enforced.76 This 
requirement of finality meant that the national courts at the seat of arbitration had to finalize 
an award before enforcement could be sought in a foreign country. This requirement of double 
exequatur was heavily criticized due to its negative impact on the efficiency of arbitration.  One 
consequence of the requirement was that the losing party could easily obstruct the 
enforcement of an award and that domestic rules influenced the arbitral process.77 In addition, 
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the burden of proof was on the party seeking enforcement,78 and left the courts no discretion. 
This made enforcement difficult, expensive and time consuming.  In making Article V(1)(e), the 
drafters sought to remove these elements, in accordance with the pro-enforcement basis of the 
Convention.79 
 
As previously mentioned, the wording of Article V(1) explicitly states that the courts “may” 
refuse enforcement of an award, granting courts discretion. As will be shown however, this 
discretion has led to debate under Article V(1)(e).  
 
Two alternative authorities are considered “competent” within the meaning of V(1)(e): the 
authority at the place of arbitration and the authority of the country of the chosen procedural 
law.80 It is quite uncommon that the procedural law of a third state is chosen. The competent 
authority is therefore, with very few exceptions, the courts of the country where the arbitration 
took place. 
 
Having made these introductory remarks, let us have a closer look at the grounds. 
 
2.5.1 A binding award 
The requirement of finality was replaced by “binding” in an attempt to abandon the 
requirement of double exequatur.  Although the drafters hoped to liberalize and advance the 
enforcement of awards, there has been much discussion as to when an award is to be 
considered binding. The term has, as its predecessor, been criticized for “inviting domestic 
enforcement standards into an international law realm”.81 
 
The expression is not defined in the Convention. As commented by H. Gharavi: “the meaning of 
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this term has always been a mystery”.82 Pieter Sanders, a central figure in the drafting process, 
also foresaw the complications of the wording: “The term is the result of a compromise and will, 
I fear, cause a diversity of interpretations in countries where enforcement is sought”.83 The 
ambiguity has led to the emergence of two alternative interpretations. The first alternative 
defines binding as an autonomous expression, while the second applies the standard of the 
country where the award was made.84 
 
The first approach has sparked two alternative views. An award will be considered binding if it 
cannot be subjected to ordinary recourse proceedings in the country of origin. The determining 
factor is whether or not the arbitral award may be appealed on its merits or on procedural 
grounds.85 The second interpretation considers an award binding if it may not be judicially 
reviewed by a higher arbitral tribunal. The approach is based on party autonomy. The 
determining factor of whether an award is binding depends solely on the arbitration agreement. 
The absence of such agreement results in a binding award. If the parties have not agreed that an 
award may be appealed, it will be considered binding, regardless of domestic laws suggesting 
the contrary. Parties may also explicitly agree that an award will be binding and final to make 
their intentions clear.   
 
The Swedish Supreme Court recognized an autonomous approach, giving effect to the 
agreement of the parties in determining the question of whether the award was binding. 86 The 
parties had agreed to ICC arbitration, under which there was no right to appeal. The Supreme 
Court found that the award was binding from the moment it was rendered. Having done so, the 
Court chose not to investigate whether the award was binding under French law, which the 
resisting party argued. Party autonomy was thus given priority.  
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In a Belgian decision, the Cours d’Appel de Bruxelles ruled that an award is binding in 
accordance with the agreement between the parties.87 The agreement in the specific case 
stipulated that an award would be final and binding upon being rendered, which the Belgian 
Court enforced. 
 
The second approach refers the determination to the applicable arbitration law. The applicable 
arbitration law may be the law of the country of origin, institutional rules or tailored procedural 
rules. Once the applicable rules have been identified, the enforcing court determines if the 
award is binding under the relevant rules. Different sets of rules contain different requirements. 
While some acknowledge the award as binding when rendered, other countries operate with 
formalities or recourse. Jurisdictions which operate with this second approach must thus 
correctly identify and apply the relevant requirements for a binding award under the applicable 
arbitration rules. It is clear that this approach invites more domestic elements into the 
determination.  
 
French courts follow this approach. In the case of Saint Gobain,88 the party resisting 
enforcement held that Indian law required the award to be confirmed by the Indian courts in 
order to be binding.  The French Court stated that an award is binding when it is without 
irregularities and complies with required formalities in the country of origin. The French court 
rejected the defence however, as a requirement of confirmation would be a requirement of 
double exequatur. Italian courts apply the same approach, maintaining that an awards binding 
effect must be determined under the law which the award was made.89 
 
The question is what approach is favorable. Born supports a uniform international definition to 
which the parties’ agreement to arbitrate should be used regardless of possible judicial 
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challenges, when this agreement provides that the award is binding.90 In support of this view is 
the drafting history of Article V(1)(e) which aims to remove the requirement of double 
exequatur. Formal requirements and confirmation in the country of origin leads to a 
preservation of this requirement. On the other hand, the French decision illustrates that the 
application of domestic law does not necessarily mean that requirements of double exequatur 
will be accepted. It would be unfortunate if national requirements to make an award binding 
would have an effect on the recognition and enforcement of an international arbitration award. 
It is also convincing that awards cannot exist without legal systems which recognize its legal 
effects. This supports the view that the applicable arbitration law should be applied. 
Nonetheless, the role of the arbitral seat was of far greater importance when the Convention 
was drafted. Much time has passed since the Convention’s drafting and a modern view of 
international awards support an enforced acceptance of party autonomy. Reliance on party 
autonomy ensures efficiency and simplifies enforcement proceedings significantly. The parties 
to arbitration would with an autonomous interpretation avoid unexpected domestic 
requirements and achieve a greater degree of predictability. In the author’s opinion, the 
autonomous approach is more favorable in the light of the aim of the Convention as well as the 
intention of the drafters. This issue may be addressed in a future reform. 
 
2.5.2 Annulment and setting aside 
A question that has given rise to much disagreement and thus variations in interpretation is 
what effect the annulment of an award should have on the enforcement in a third state. The 
effect of annulment is that the award loses its legal effect in the state of annulment. In short, 
the award seizes to exist. A difference of interpretation has arisen as to the effect of such 
annulment. As will be seen, the dominating view is that the enforcing courts will respect an 
annulment by a competent authority. However, certain courts have chosen to enforce such 
awards. This difference causes difficulty as both solutions fall within the wording of V(1)(e).  
 
The two approaches are known as the territorial approach and the delocalized approach 
                                                          
90
 Born, 2818 and 2819. 
29 
 
respectively. The two will be examined and analyzed in the following. Finally, a conclusion will 
be offered as to the gravity of the difference and which is the more favorable approach. 
 
Under the territorial approach, the court in the country enforcement will generally respect an 
annulment and therefore refuse recognition and enforcement where an award has been set 
aside in the country of origin.  This view has long been dominant among the Member States.91  
The reasoning behind the approach is that arbitration awards are valid and given legal effects 
through national rules. By choosing a particular country the parties to arbitration must also 
submit to the arbitration laws of that country. In addition, followers of the territorial approach 
point to uniformity of interpretation in defense of the approach. It is unsatisfactory if 
annulment proceedings and enforcement proceedings lead to opposite conclusions. 
 
In China, Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law prescribes that a court “shall … make a written 
order not to allow the enforcement of the award” if the court finds that one of the listed 
grounds are present.92 In relation to Article V(1)(e) this means that the Chinese courts are given 
no discretion if the competent authority at the place of origin has set the award aside. The same 
approach in applied in Germany and Sweden, to mention some. The territorial approach is by 
far the most used solution in the Contracting States. 
 
The alternative approach considers arbitration an international phenomenon where the place of 
arbitration is usually of little to no importance. The arbitration proceedings are considered 
detached or delocalized from the forum, making a national annulment of an award irrelevant to 
the enforcement in a third state. The approach finds justification in the wording of Article V 
which leaves discretion to the courts.  
 
Only France has so fully adapted this delocalized approach. The development in France 
happened over time. Two central French decisions will be used to illustrate this development. 
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In the first case,93 an English company, Hilmarton, provided assistance to OTV in a bid to acquire 
and perform a contract in Algeria. Disputes arose in relation to the commission and Hilmartion 
initiated ICC arbitration in Switzerland. The ICC tribunal rejected the claim and OTV sought to 
have the decision enforced in France. At the same time, Hilmarton sought to set the award 
aside in Switzerland. Both parties were successful and Hilmarton appealed the French decision 
on the basis of the annulment in Switzerland. In its reasoning, the lower court relied upon the 
more favorable rights provision in Article VII of the Convention, arguing that a French judge 
could not refuse enforcement unless prescribed in domestic law. Going into the relevant 
national provision, Article 1502 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, it was found that the setting 
aside of an award was not listed as a ground for non-recognition. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the reasoning, holding that the award existed despite of its annulment in Switzerland and that 
enforcement in France was not contrary to international public policy. 
 
In Chromalloy94 an American company and the State of Egypt entered into a contract in which 
Chromalloy was to maintain and repair helicopters. A dispute arose and arbitration proceedings 
commenced in Egypt, resulting in an award in favor of Chromalloy. Egypt sought to have the 
award set aside in Egypt and succeeded. In France, the lower court, despite the annulment, 
enforced the award, in line with the Hilmarton decision. Egypt appealed. In affirming the lower 
courts decision, the Paris Cour d’Appel confirmed that French courts may not refuse recognition 
or enforcement based on an annulment in the country of origin.  
 
As seen from the two above decisions, French law does not permit awards to be refused 
enforcement or recognition, although it has been set aside by a competent authority. The 
reasoning is based on the more favorable rights provision of the Convention, which enables 
national law to be applied where it is more favorable than the Convention.  In this sense, the 
reasoning of the French courts is well-founded. The decisions have nevertheless been heavily 
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criticized due to the conflicting practice of most Member States.  
 
In the U.S., practice has been inconsistent. The development is particularly interesting in the 
context of achieving uniformity.  
 
In Chromalloy,95 the same award as above, Chromalloy initiated enforcement proceedings in the 
U.S. As in France, Egypt contested that enforcement should be refused as the award had been 
set aside in Egypt. The U.S. Court decided to enforce the award. The judge emphasized in his 
reasoning that the court “must” grant recognition and enforcement unless a ground of non-
recognition is found. And if so found, “the Court may, at its discretion, decline to enforce the 
award.”96 Chromalloy held that Article VII of the Convention enabled them to invoke the FAA, 
which prescribed that the Court must consider Chromalloy’s claims under applicable U.S. law. 
Under the FAA, enforcement could not be denied on the ground that the award had been 
annulled in the place of origin. Consequently the court granted enforcement, despite of the 
award being set-aside in Egypt. The District Court here showed that U.S. Courts can and will 
enforce foreign arbitral awards, even if they have been set-aside. The decision has been 
criticized in theory and in later practice. 
 
In a later decision,97 Baker Marine (“Baker”) entered into an agreement to provide barge 
services for Chevron in Nigeria. A dispute of breach of contact arose, and Baker initiated 
arbitration proceedings in Nigeria. The arbitrators held that Baker was to be awarded damages 
from two defendants. The losing parties applied to have the decision set-aside before the courts 
of Nigeria, an action which succeeded. Baker sought enforcement in New York. The New York 
Court denied Baker’s petition to have the award enforced. Unlike the above decision, the judge 
stated that it would “not be proper to enforce a foreign arbitral award under the Convention 
when such an award has been set aside by the Nigerian courts.” Baker attempted to argue, as 
Chromalloy, that Article VII of the Convention must apply and lead to the application of U.S. law 
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which rejects the annulment in Nigeria as a reason for non-enforcement in the U.S. The Court 
rejected this reasoning, holding that the parties agreed to have their disputes arbitrated under 
Nigerian law and that nothing suggested that the parties intended to apply U.S. domestic law. 
The Court accepted that it had discretion, but concluded that Baker had “shown no reason for 
refusing to recognize the judgments of the Nigerian court.”  
 
In a 2007 decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit largely followed the reasoning in 
Baker. 98  An arbitral award rendered in Columbia had been annulled by Columbian courts as it 
violated Columbian law. TermoRio sought recognition and enforcement of the award in the 
District of Columbia. The lower court refused recognition and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
Court commented that the Convention does not “endorse a regime in which secondary states … 
second-guess the judgment of a primary State, when the court in the primary State has lawfully 
acted pursuant to “competent authority” to “set aside” an arbitration award made in its 
country.”99 The defense of U.S. domestic law was explicitly rejected, while the court stated that 
it “must be very careful in weighing notions of “public policy” in determining whether to credit 
the judgment of a court in the primary State vacating an arbitration award.”100 Such breach of 
public policy was not found. 
 
As seen from these above decisions, the U.S. courts have had conflicting views on the problem 
of set-aside and annulled awards. The development does indicate however, that the courts are 
stepping away from the delocalized approach in favor of greater deference to the competent 
authority in the country where the award was made. Although Chromalloy has not been directly 
overruled, it appears to have lost any influence. With this development, U.S. practice is 
consistent with the practice of most Member States, a step in the right direction in achieving a 
greater level of uniformity internationally.  
 
France remains the only jurisdiction which explicitly recognizes and follows the delocalized 
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approach. The difference is, as seen, made possible by the ambiguity of the Convention, 
rendering both interpretations valid. With France as the only major exception however, the 
severity of the problem is equally limited. Substantial practice exists to the question, with a 
clear majority view. The situation is quite clearly satisfactory is light of the vast number of 
member states. This minor difference is therefore, in the opinion of the author, a non-issue in 
the context of overall uniformity. 
 
2.6 Article V(2)(a) 
The first ground under Article V(2) enables the reviewing court to refuse recognition or 
enforcement if the subject-matter of an award is not arbitrable.  
 
Arbitrability refers to whether a dispute may be resolved through arbitration. Party autonomy is 
the general rule, making any dispute arbitrable. As explicitly stated in the provision, the law of 
the place of enforcement determines whether a dispute is capable of settlement through 
arbitration. The purpose of the exception is to leave the Member States a “safety-valve”101 in 
prescribing that certain disputes fall within the exclusive domain of its domestic courts of law.  
The reasoning behind this is apparent. Arbitration is a private dispute resolution mechanism 
between the parties to the agreement. Agreements affecting third parties or state issues such 
as political and social matters may be considered unsuitable for settlement through arbitration. 
The exception is closely related to that of public policy. Ultimately each nation, through its 
domestic law, determines which disputes will remain exclusively within the sphere of its 
domestic courts. 
 
In drafting the Convention, it was feared that the exception would invite domestic rules into the 
sphere of international dispute resolution.102 Such a fear has proven unfounded, as the 
exception has had minimal practical significance. The Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, 
which has published judgments on the New York Convention since 1976, only contains 3 cases 
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in which recognition and enforcement has been refused under V(2)(a).103 Due to its limited 
importance, only a few general national trends of relevance to international uniformity will be 
pointed out in this section.  
 
Competition and antitrust disputes were in the U.S. and elsewhere a field reserved for domestic 
courts. It was considered improper to settle such disputes through arbitration and thus 
prohibited.104  
 
This long dominating view changed with the Mitsubishi decision.105 A joint venture was entered 
into between Chrysler International and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc. entered into a distribution agreement with Chrysler International and a sales procedure 
agreement with Mitsubishi and Chrysler International for the purpose of selling cars in Puerto 
Rico. The contract contained an arbitration clause calling for arbitration in Japan. A dispute 
arose and Mitsubishi started an action before the federal district court. It filed a request for an 
order to arbitrate in Japan. Soler claimed, inter alia, that Mitsubishi and Chrysler International 
had “conspired to divide the markets in restraint of trade”106, in other words, that the dispute 
was not capable of settlement through arbitration.  
 
The Supreme Court had “to consider whether an American court should enforce an agreement 
to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an international 
transaction.” The Court first held that the parties had agreed to include antitrust claims in the 
arbitration clause and then moved on to the question if the “antitrust claims are nonarbitrable 
even though it has agreed to arbitrate them.”107 The Court rejected long standing arguments 
against the arbitration of antitrust claims, holding that there is “no reason to assume at the 
outset of the dispute that international arbitration will not provide an adequate mechanism [to 
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resolve antitrust issues].” Having permitted arbitration of antitrust claims, the Supreme Court 
added that “the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws 
has been addressed.” 108 It would “not require intrusive inquiry [at the enforcing stage] to 
ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.”109 
Known as the second-look doctrine, this reservation allows for a minimal control at the time of 
enforcement of whether the applicable competition law was applied and considered. Should 
this not be the case, an award may be refused recognition and enforcement under the public 
policy exception. The Court concluded that the matter was arbitrable and referred the dispute 
to arbitration. This case is not alone in applying a wide concept of arbitrability, and instead 
leaving the matter to public policy.  
 
A similar stance has been taken in the European Union. In the Eco Swiss decision,110 the 
European Court of Justice ruled that an arbitration agreement containing EU competition law 
claims was valid and enforceable. As in Mitsubishi, the Court included a reservation of judicial 
review through annulment as well as in enforcement proceedings. The decision has been 
followed by most EU member states, many which have subsequently opened the door for 
arbitration of domestic competition law.111 This development in both the EU and U.S. is part of a 
clear trend in which the exception of arbitrability has largely been noted. Although widely held, 
not all jurisdictions are as willing to allow arbitration of competition matters.112  
 
While certain countries exclude certain categories of disputes from arbitration,113 there is no 
doubt that number of matters considered non-arbitrable is low. As already pointed out, the 
defence has barely had practical consequences. There appears to be international willingness to 
have a wide concept of arbitrability and the existing differences have had no notable impact on 
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the Convention’s aim of uniformity. In this context, the exception is a success which leaves little 
need for change.  
 
2.7 Article V(2)(b) 
Finally, the exequatur Court may refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards if it 
would be “contrary to the public policy of that country”. The wording explicitly prescribes that it 
is the public policy of the enforcing state that is relevant. Public policy is not defined in the 
Convention and therefore opens the door for national variation. It has led to great controversy 
in terms of both application and interpretation and is consequently the most problematic 
ground for non-recognition under the Convention in ways of achieving uniformity and 
predictability. 
 
In an almost 200 year old decision,114 an English Judge commented upon the defense of public 
policy that: “It is never argued at all but where other points fail”. This has proven to be 
inaccurate. Consistent with the Swiss study referred to above,115 Born comments that it is “[o]ne 
of the most frequently invoked bases for refusing to recognize an international arbitral 
award.”116 The answer to this development no doubt lies in the ambiguity and wide nature of 
the concept of public policy. In drafting the Convention, the exception originally included a 
reference to principles of law, in addition to public policy. In an attempt to limit the scope of the 
exception to the largest possible extent, the reference was omitted.117 It was intended that the 
provision should be given a narrow scope of interpretation.118 Despite such intention, the 
ground leaves plenty of room for national peculiarities and thus causes great difficulty in 
relation to uniformity. The question in the following is whether the exception has turned into a 
loophole for national courts to exploit and so undermines the aims of the Convention. 
 
In 1998, the exception of public policy was used to refuse recognition of an award in England in 
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the decision of Soleimany v Soleimany.119 A father and son engaged in a carpet export business, 
in which carpets were exported from Iran to England. Iranian law prohibited such export.  A 
dispute arose between the two as to the proceeds of sale and the dispute was submitted to 
arbitration by the Beth Din, applying Jewish law. The Beth Din gave no effect to the illegality of 
the smuggling and made an award in favor of the son.  In enforcement proceedings in England, 
the father claimed that the illegality was contrary to English public policy. The English judge 
stated that the parties “cannot by procuring an arbitration conceal that they, or rather one of 
them, is seeking to enforce an illegal contract. Public policy will not allow it”. Under English law 
the contract itself would be considered an illegality. It was thus necessary for the Court to 
refuse enforcement of the award. The facts of the case are extreme, and it illustrates the 
fundamental nature of the concept of public policy.  
 
In the much mentioned case of Parsons & Whittemore,120 Overseas raised the defense that the 
enforcement of the arbitral award would be contrary to U.S. public policy. The claim was based 
on a collapse in diplomatic relations between Egypt and the U.S., which led to Overseas leaving 
Egypt and failing to perform its contractual obligations. An arbitral award was rendered in favor 
of the claimant, RAKTA. In the enforcement proceedings, the U.S. Court stated that the 
provision concerning public policy offered “no certain guidelines to its construction”. It moved 
on to look to the drafting and the opinions of commentators, without finding guidance. Instead 
the Court looked to the history of the Convention as a whole. It put weight to the “pro-
enforcement bias” sought by the drafters in replacing the Geneva Convention and stated that it 
“points toward a narrow reading of the public policy defense.” Any other interpretation would 
according to the court “vitiate the Convention’s basic effort to remove pre-existing obstacles of 
enforcement.” The Court went on to conclude that “the Convention’s public policy defense 
should be construed narrowly” and that enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may only be 
denied where it would “violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”  On 
these grounds, the Court found that the public policy defense could “easily be dismissed” and 
that denying enforcement because of the United States’ falling out with Egypt would convert 
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the defense into a “major loophole in the Convention’s mechanism for enforcement”. The award 
was enforced. The opinion has been upheld in subsequent practice and has gained wide 
acceptance.121  
 
As seen from the judgment, the U.S. Court put substantial weight to the purpose of the 
Convention, allowing only the most fundamental breaches of public policy. In so doing, the 
Court applied an international form of U.S. public policy, different from that applied to domestic 
disputes.  This international public policy is clearly far more narrow and mild in its application. 
Through this now widely accepted distinction, the matters falling under public policy has been 
reduced significantly. As will be seen, this concept of international public policy, as opposed to 
domestic public policy, has been adopted in a majority of the Member States.   
 
The Court of Appeal of Celle in Germany commented upon the issue in a case where the 
winning party sought to enforce an award from the International Commercial Arbitration 
Court.122 The defendant claimed that enforcement would be a violation of public policy as the 
award contained procedural flaws and because the award contained a contractual penalty 
which the defendant found disproportionate. The German judge held that “[T]here must be a 
violation of international public policy” and that international public policy “is a rule subject to a 
less strict regime than domestic arbitral decisions.” To this effect the Court concluded that 
“[T]here is a violation of international public policy only when the consequences of the 
application of foreign law in a concrete case is so at odds with German provisions as to be 
unacceptable according to German principles. This is not the case here.”123  
 
The interpretation of the French Cour de Cassation also corresponds with the two above 
decisions.124 The Court drew a clear distinction between domestic and international public 
policy. The defendant argued that the arbitral award, having applied EC Competition Law, was 
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not permitted to do so and thus breached public policy. The French judge commented that only 
“flagrant, effective and concrete” violations of international public policy may be relevant and 
made reference to fundamental concepts of morality and justice. Through this reference, the 
judge reserved the exception for only the most serious breaches of French legal principles.  
 
In a Hong Kong decision,125 the Court of Final Appeal held that the exception of public policy 
must be interpreted narrowly and cover only situations “contrary to fundamental conceptions of 
morality and justice of the forum”. The choice of words in the mentioned jurisdictions is largely 
similar. 
 
The above judgments therefore support a general tendency of interpreting the public policy 
exception narrowly in respect of the history and purpose of the Convention through the 
application of international public policy. Only fundamental breaches of national legal principles 
will lead to an award being refused.  Such public policy may include fundamental mandatory 
rules of procedural or material nature. The approach is however not entirely uniform. In certain 
jurisdictions the concept of public policy has been given a wider meaning, opening the 
exception to unfortunate national peculiarities.   
 
In China, a decision from 1997 shows how the exception of public policy may lead to 
unexpected and unfortunate results. 126 A U.S. heavy metal rock band had been awarded 
compensation for lost income by CIETAC. The bands upcoming performance in China had been 
banned by the Chinese Ministry of Culture which had found that the band performed 
outrageous acts on its concerts. In the enforcement proceedings, the Supreme People’s Court 
(the “SPC”) concluded that the award was contrary to national sentiments and contrary to social 
and public interests. As seen from this reference, the SPC clearly applied a wide definition of the 
public policy exception, in sharp contrast with the above decisions. In China the decision “gave 
rise to considerable concern that a floodgate would be open for a charitable application [of the 
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public policy exception].”127  The decision stands in sharp contrast to the international public 
policy approach.  
 
In an attempt to remedy the inconsistent refusal of foreign arbitral awards, the SPC issued a 
notice prescribing a system of automatic appeal.128 Should a People’s Court consider refusing 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, the decision must be submitted to a High People’s 
Court. In term the High People’s Court must, if it wishes to refuse enforcement, submit its 
opinion to the SPC. Only after such approval from the SPC may the award be refused recognition 
or enforcement.  This system has clear disadvantages in ways of efficiency. The appeal process 
takes substantial time, and harms the Convention’s aim of efficient enforcement of foreign 
awards. On the other hand, the system has had a positive effect in sense of the supervisory role 
of the SPC, leading to greater uniformity. As pointed out by Xia Xiaohong, the system has made 
refusals more difficult. Between 2002 and 2006, 4 out of 9 awards submitted for review by the 
SPC, were recognized and enforced.129 Out of these, only one case was refused enforcement 
under the public policy exception. The heavy metal decision remains the only known case where 
recognition was refused on grounds of national sentiments.130  As seen by the above, the 
world’s most populous country as well as major exporter has made great attempts at reaching 
more Convention-friendly results. Although Chinese courts have made no reference to 
international public policy, it is apparent that the SPC is careful in its application of the 
exception.  
 
Turkey remains an unfortunate example of how public policy may be used to stop undesirable 
awards. In this well-known decision,131 the arbitrators in Zurich applied Turkish law to the merits 
and Swiss procedural law.  In its 1995 decision, the Turkish Supreme Court found that the ICC 
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had violated Turkish public policy by not applying Turkish law to both the substance and 
procedure, despite the fact that the choice of procedural law had no influence on the outcome 
of the decision. From an international perspective, the decision has been deemed incorrect, 
unfortunate and unjustified.132 It remains an example of the potential consequences of the 
exception’s ambiguity and domestic public policy. It is however, and luckily so, very uncommon 
for such abuse to occur. 
 
The exception of public policy may potentially be unpredictable and lead to decisions advancing 
local interests and policy. In the words of the English judge, the exception may be “a very unruly 
horse, and when you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.”133 However, there is 
room for optimism. The exception has given national courts opportunity to give the provision a 
wide meaning and thus limit the effectiveness of the Convention. Despite this possibility of 
abuse, most national courts usually only refuse enforcement in exceptional cases. Through 
reference to international public policy and fundamental principles of morality and justice, most 
Member States apply a narrow interpretation and Convention-friendly approach. Looking to 
China, it is clearly visible how the Supreme People’s Court has attempted to adapt to this 
position. Countries are ultimately interested in being considered a viable and attractive venue 
for arbitration. To achieve such status among parties to international commerce, it is essential 
that the grounds for non-recognition are interpreted and used in line with the Convention and 
its purpose. Countries loyal to the purpose of the Convention will always be preferred to those 
that are not. This international pressure to be arbitration friendly undoubtedly helps iron out 
some of the differences in application of Article V(2)(b). While it is inevitable that certain courts 
will misuse the exception in order to prevent enforcement of judgments which it may find 
unfavorable, the limited amount of such misuse leads to the conclusion that the public policy 
exception has indeed not turned into a black hole in which national courts may freely dispose of 
undesirable arbitral awards.   
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3. A need for reform? 
The question this paper has attempted to answer is whether Article V of The New York 
Convention needs to be reformed or whether the global benefits of the Convention outweigh 
such a need. Throughout this paper, individual conclusions have been provided under each 
section. The overall need for reform will be considered here. 
 
Achieving uniformity is a problem for any international convention or agreement. The EU is an 
example which illustrates the complexity of the issue. With 28 Member States and 28 sets of 
national courts trying to give a consistent interpretation of EU law, problems of uniformity are 
inevitable. The courts of the EU Member States have the benefit of guidance from the European 
Court of Justice. There is no similar mechanism under the New York Convention and neither can 
there be one. With the example of the EU in mind, it is easy to see how problems of uniformity 
arise with the 149 members to the New York Convention. While such problems of uniformity 
exist under Article V in particular, they do not necessarily justify reform. 
 
The Convention is of fundamental importance within the field of international arbitration.  In 
the words of Veeder: “it [the Convention] is the lubricating super-oil for the complex machinery 
which has made the explosion of global trade possible over the last 50 years.”134 It is short and 
simplistic, with its only 16 Articles. It is respected and applied, with some exceptions, in light of 
its purpose of ensuring recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In 1958, 
arbitration had a far simpler place in international commerce. Should the Convention be 
amended today, states and organizations alike would undoubtedly stop at nothing to add their 
own ideas and suggestions. The process would be highly time consuming and equally 
problematic.  A likely outcome of such a process would be an increase in both Articles and 
words. As seen above, the few words already used have caused great debate and problems. The 
addition of more words would be likely to leave far more room for domestic differences. Too 
many words, and worse yet, the wrong words, would quite possibly do more harm than good. 
The importance of Article V makes it a natural victim of such a process.  
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Summarizing the above sections, the grounds set forth in Article V appears to have achieved 
reasonable balance between enforceability and procedural safety. The seven exceptions have 
not prevented parties to arbitration from having their awards enforced, but has helped remove 
the most unfortunate awards and given arbitrators an incentive to strive for the highest 
standards in rendering awards. It equally encourages parties to create accurate and 
sophisticated arbitration agreements which will be enforced. While the grounds contained 
within Article V hold plenty of domestic differences, overall uniformity appears surprisingly 
present. 
 
Article V(2)(b), which leaves domestic courts large discretion, has been abused by some states. 
While such abuse will occur in the future, the severity of the problem should not be 
exaggerated. Most courts will attempt to apply a Convention friendly approach, otherwise 
risking the distrust and criticism of other jurisdictions as well as the international business 
community. In addition, consistent and widespread practice does have an effect on other 
Member States, slowly spreading to dissenting jurisdictions. Ultimately this helps increase the 
uniformity across all Member States. In this sense, the Convention has been largely self-
regulating, leaving room for optimism. Through now five decades of practice, there has been 
great development through legislative interpretation. In light of the judgments used throughout 
this paper, the author believes this positive development will continue. 
 
The originally bare words of the Convention have grown into powerful tools, creating a strong 
and well-tested instrument. Attempting to reform this instrument may shatter it. The hard 
earned international trust and respect has come through years of practice and is just as easily 
taken away, should too many changes be presented. The result of the development of the 
Convention is that arbitral awards are enforced and recognized, making arbitration the most 
effective way of resolving international commercial disputes. The Convention’s overall success 
would be put at risk through reform, a reform which does not seem necessary in light of the 
current state of Article V.  This author believes that the overall success of the Convention as well 
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as the benefits of existing practice, outweigh the need for reform.  
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